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CONVICTIONS BASED ON CHARACTER: AN EMPIRICAL TEST
OF OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE
Michael D. Cicchini*
Lawrence T. White
“So my word is not enough; my promise worthless;
the fact that I have served my time nothing but the
emblem of my continuing guilt.”1

Abstract
Despite the time-honored judicial principle that “we try cases, rather
than persons,” courts routinely allow prosecutors to use defendants’ prior,
unrelated bad acts at trial. Courts acknowledge that jurors could
improperly use this other-acts evidence as proof of the defendant’s bad
character. However, courts theorize that if the other acts are also relevant
for a permissible purpose—such as proving the defendant’s identity as
the perpetrator of the charged crime—then a cautionary instruction will
cure the problem, and any prejudice is “presumed erased from the jury’s
mind.”
We put this judicial assumption to an empirical test. We recruited 249
participants to serve as mock jurors in a hypothetical criminal case. After
reading the identical case summary, jurors were randomly assigned to one
of two groups, each of which received different evidence on the issue of
identity. Group A received conclusive proof, in the form of a stipulation,
that if a crime was committed, the defendant was the one who committed
it. Group A convicted at the rate of 33.1%. Group B received less certain
evidence of identity in the form of the defendant’s somewhat similar,
prior conviction, along with a cautionary instruction that this other act
may not be used as evidence of the defendant’s character. Group B
convicted at the much higher rate of 48.0%.
The difference in conviction rates is statistically significant. Further,
jurors in Group B were also more confident in their verdicts despite
receiving less certain evidence of guilt and a cautionary instruction.
These empirical findings demonstrate that cautionary instructions are not
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effective, and jurors will use other-acts evidence for impermissible
purposes including, for example, the forbidden character inference.
Given this, we discuss several pretrial strategies for defense counsel to
limit the prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibits the government
from introducing evidence at trial of a criminal defendant’s bad character.
Instead, to win a conviction, the prosecutor must prove what the
defendant actually did with regard to the charged crime. What the
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defendant may have done in the past and, more specifically, what kind of
person he is should not serve as the basis for a new conviction.2
Despite this time-honored prohibition on character evidence, courts
still permit prosecutors to use a defendant’s prior, unrelated bad acts at
trial. Courts acknowledge that such other-acts evidence goes to the
defendant’s character; however, as long as the prosecutor offers the other
acts ostensibly for a permissible purpose—such as proof of the
defendant’s identity, intent, or absence of accident with regard to the
charged crime—courts typically allow the prosecutor to use the
evidence.3
Due to the highly prejudicial nature of other-acts evidence, courts
instruct jurors that they are not to use the defendant’s other acts to decide
that he is a bad person and is therefore guilty of the charged crime. Rather,
jurors are to use the other acts only for a limited purpose—for example,
to decide whether the defendant is the perpetrator or whether the
defendant’s actions were intentional or accidental. Once a court gives this
cautionary instruction, all unfair prejudice is presumed to be wiped from
jurors’ minds.4
Given the obvious incompatibility between this judicial assumption
and the way the human mind actually works, we decided to conduct a
controlled study on other-acts evidence, cautionary instructions, and the
issue of identity. We recruited 249 participants to serve as mock jurors in
a hypothetical criminal case. After reading a case summary—including
the elements of the crime, a summary of trial testimony, and an
instruction on the burden of proof—participants were randomly assigned
to one of two groups, each of which received different evidence on the
issue of identity.5
Group A (N = 124) received conclusive proof on the issue of identity
in the form of a stipulation and convicted the defendant at a rate of 33.1%.
Group B (N = 125) received far less certain evidence on the issue of
identity: the defendant’s somewhat similar, prior bad act, along with a
cautionary instruction that such evidence should not be used to decide
that the defendant has a bad character and is therefore guilty of the
charged crime. Even though the defendant’s other act was inconclusive
evidence of identity and was accompanied by a cautionary instruction,
Group B convicted the defendant at a rate of 48.0%.6
Group B’s conviction rate was nearly 50% higher than Group A’s, a
statistically significant difference. Jurors in Group B were also more
certain they had chosen the correct verdict. These empirical findings
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Sections IV.A–IV.D.
See infra Section IV.E.
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provide strong evidence that the courts’ assumption is wrong. The
evidence demonstrates that cautionary instructions are not effective in
limiting the prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence. Rather, jurors use
other acts for impermissible purposes, such as determining that the
defendant has a bad character and, for that reason, is guilty of the crime
charged.7
Part I of this Article discusses the policy behind the prohibition on
character evidence. Part II discusses the rule on other-acts evidence and
explains how prosecutors circumvent the character-evidence prohibition
by ostensibly using the other acts for permissible purposes. Part III then
discusses, and gives examples of, the cautionary instructions that are
intended to protect the defendant from the impermissible character
inference associated with other acts.
Part IV of this Article describes our controlled study, including our
hypothesis, our study design, and our empirical findings. Part V discusses
the findings in more detail and further explores the prejudicial impact of
other-acts evidence. Part VI then offers pretrial strategies for defense
counsel when dealing with other-acts evidence. These strategies include
the use of our empirical findings to demonstrate that the unfair prejudice
of other acts substantially outweighs any probative value. Finally, Part
VII discusses the limitations of our study design and considers possible
alternative methodologies for other researchers.
I. “WE TRY CASES, RATHER THAN PERSONS”
A deeply rooted principle in criminal law is that a jury should not
convict a defendant of a crime because of his prior, unrelated bad acts.
Rather, a jury should judge a defendant on the evidence specific to the
crime with which he is charged. “[I]n our system of jurisprudence, we try
cases, rather than persons, and thus a jury may look only to the evidence
of the events in question, not defendants’ prior acts in reaching its
verdict.”8
There are many good reasons to cling to this basic tenet of criminal
law. If jurors hear evidence of a defendant’s other acts, they may convict
not because they believe he is guilty of the charged crime, but rather to

7. See infra Part V.
8. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988) (citing United States v. Mitchell,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 357 (1795)). For a history of the rule prohibiting the use of other acts to
prove a defendant’s character, see Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule
404(b): The Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 951–
58 (1988) (explaining the prohibition “has its roots in Great Britain’s Treason Act of 1695”).
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punish him (again) for his prior misdeeds.9 In effect, the defendant would
never be able to atone for his other acts. This, of course, would be
“antithetical to the precept that ‘a defendant starts his life afresh when he
stands before a jury.’”10
Similarly, jurors may use the other-acts evidence to convict the
defendant preemptively, reasoning that, although he may be “innocent
momentarily,” society must be protected from the crimes he might
commit in the future.11 This desire for the illusion of security is a strong
one, and some prosecutors are willing to exploit it in order to win
convictions.12
Beyond these risks, however, the most significant risk of other-acts
evidence is that jurors will “generaliz[e] a defendant’s earlier bad act into
bad character and tak[e] that as raising the odds that he did the . . . act
now charged.”13 To illustrate this, assume that a defendant is charged
with battery but claims he acted in self-defense. If jurors were to hear
evidence of his prior, unrelated battery conviction, they may well find
him guilty of the current battery charge—not because they are persuaded
by the accuser’s testimony, but because the defendant committed a prior
battery. This can cause jurors to conclude that the defendant is a violent
or hot-tempered person and is therefore guilty of the charged crime.
Arguably, a defendant’s character could be relevant evidence. After
all, most battery crimes are committed by hot-tempered persons; it
follows that a defendant’s character trait for being hot-tempered is
relevant to show that he “is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the
crime.”14 So the problem is not that “character is irrelevant; on the
9. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v.
Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)) (discussing the risk that the jury, “uncertain of
guilt . . . will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment”).
10. People v. Crawford, 582 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Mich. 1998) (quoting People v. Zackowitz,
254 N.Y. 192, 197 (1930)).
11. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180–81.
12. See, e.g., Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that “the
prosecutor could have been understood to be telling the jury to convict irrespective of Hennon’s
guilt or innocence, lest an acquittal be interpreted as a green light for street gangs and drive-by
killings”).
13. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added).
14. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948). However, this simplistic
reasoning may be flawed. See Linda S. Eads et al., Getting It Right: The Trial of Sexual Assault
and Child Molestation Cases Under Federal Rules of Evidence 413–15, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 169,
171 (2000) (“[W]e risk inaccuracy when we assume consistency of behavior over time and
circumstances . . . .”). Further, individuals all around us defy their fundamental character and
control their violent urges on a daily basis. State and federal governments even tout this fact to
justify their massive expenditures of taxpayer dollars on correctional programs. See, e.g., NAT’L
INST. OF CORRECTIONS, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT: A REVIEW AND DISCUSSION FOR
CORRECTIONS PROFESSIONALS 17 (2007), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/021657.pdf (explaining
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contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury, and to so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny
him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”15
Given this, the general ban on character evidence is a hallmark of a
system that values fundamental fairness and the appearance of fairness.
And while it is true that modern rules of evidence have carved into this
time-honored principle to some extent,16 courts still continue to honor, at
least superficially,17 the idea that a defendant should only be convicted
“for what he did, not for who he is.”18 However, even when this characterevidence prohibition remains fully intact, courts still permit prosecutors
to use a defendant’s other acts at trial—provided the other acts have some
valid purpose in addition to proving the defendant’s character. In fact, as
discussed below, the use of other-acts evidence has become incredibly
common, if not the norm.
II. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE
Most commonly, other-acts evidence takes the form of a defendant’s
prior conviction for a similarly-named crime, as in the battery example
above. However, prosecutors can use other-acts evidence at a defendant’s
trial even if he was found not guilty of the other acts and even if the state
previously declined to prosecute the other acts. Further, while other-acts
evidence is usually similar to the charged crime, it need not be. And the
other acts—regardless of whether they are similar in nature to the current
charge—may involve the same alleged victim or someone entirely
different. Most significantly—and unlike the use of a defendant’s prior
convictions for impeachment purposes—other acts are admissible
regardless of whether the defendant testifies in his own defense.19
offenders “learn to identify those factors that create their anger and role-play ways to competently
use self-control techniques”).
15. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475–76 (emphasis added). Worse yet, “[i]f the criminal justice
system convicts people based on who they are, not what they have done, we are all at
risk . . . . [and w]e increase the risk of reinforcing errors based on fallacious stereotypical
judgment.” Eads et al., supra note 14, at 176 (emphasis added).
16. See Eads et al., supra note 14, at 177 (“[S]ome states have recognized for decades the
lustful disposition exception to the general ban on character evidence in cases involving sexual
assault.”). In Wisconsin, for example, the prosecutor may use a defendant’s prior, first-degree
sexual assault conviction “as evidence of the person’s character in order to show that the person
acted in conformity therewith.” WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)(2) (2017) (emphasis added).
17. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Spreigl Evidence: Still Searching for a Principled Rule, 35
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1368, 1372 (2009) (arguing that Minnesota’s rule on other-acts evidence
“only pretends to enforce some ill-defined prohibition on character evidence”).
18. United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977).
19. For a discussion of the overwhelming variety of other-acts evidence, see DANIEL
BLINKA, EVIDENCE—WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES § 404.602 (4th ed. 2017). One of the most
common types of other-acts evidence is a defendant’s prior conviction for a completely unrelated
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The rules governing the admissibility of other-acts evidence are
highly nuanced, vary significantly from state to state, and are
inconsistently applied even within states.20 In most jurisdictions,
admissibility is generally governed by a rule very similar to Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b), Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts, which states:
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted
in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses . . . . This evidence may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.21
These enumerated, permissible purposes are not exclusive. In fact,
except for the prohibition on using such evidence to prove character, there
is virtually no limit on how the creative prosecutor can use a defendant’s
other acts at trial.22
Returning to our earlier battery example where the defendant claims
self-defense, the prosecutor could simply offer the previous battery
conviction not to prove the defendant’s character trait for being hottempered, but rather to demonstrate his identity as the perpetrator; his
but similarly-named crime. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)(1) (Other-acts evidence “is
admissible without regard to whether the victim of the crime that is the subject of the proceeding
is the same as the victim of the similar act.”).
20. See, e.g., Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1372 (“The current [other-acts] doctrine in
Minnesota is a Potemkin village.”); see also Robert Cameron, The Modified Just Rule: A New
Standard for the Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under Rules 403 and
404(b) of the Montana Rules of Evidence, 53 MONT. L. REV. 133, 133 (1992) (“In Montana other
crimes evidence has been subject to widely varying standards of admissibility.”).
21. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). A defendant’s crimes, wrongs, or other acts may also be
admissible under other rules of evidence, including FED. R. EVID. 413, 414, 608(b), 609. These
rules may admit the same evidence but in varying level of detail, for different purposes, or through
different methods of proof. See infra note 36 and accompanying text for further discussion of
using a defendant’s prior conviction as impeachment evidence under FED. R. EVID. 609 and
comparable state statutes.
22. States that follow the so-called inclusionary approach allow the use of other acts for any
purpose other than character. See State v. Hunt, 666 N.W.2d 771, 787 (Wis. 2003) (allowing other
acts to show “context” and “the victim’s state of mind,” as well as “to corroborate information
provided to the police” and “to establish the credibility of victims and witnesses”); David F.
Guldenschuh, Federal Rules of Evidence – Rule 404(b) Limits the Admission of Other Crimes
Evidence, Under an Inclusionary Approach, to Cases Where It Is Relevant to an Issue in Dispute,
55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 574, 574 (1980).
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intent to cause bodily harm; and the lack of accident in causing bodily
harm. Further, the prosecutor can also use the previous battery conviction
to demonstrate that the defendant did not act in self-defense.
While early courts cautioned that other-acts evidence should be used
“sparingly and only when reasonably necessary,”23 the floodgates have
since been opened wide. The courts’ original position on other-acts
evidence “has been remolded and chiseled down in recent years to the
point that this once well-settled exclusion now serves as more of an
exception rather than the rule.”24 Today, once the prosecutor offers the
other acts ostensibly for a permissible purpose, the “concrete result is that
propensity evidence is regularly allowed in the guise of
404(b) . . . evidence.”25 More to the point, other-acts evidence is simply
“character evidence in disguise.”26
In reality, a defendant’s other acts are usually far more probative of
his character than any of the delineated statutory purposes. For example,
in the hypothetical battery case, would the defendant’s unrelated, prior
battery conviction really prove his identity, intent, lack of accident, or
absence of self-defense in the current battery case? Usually it does not.
Typically, the other act involved different facts and circumstances, was
committed against a different person, and occurred months or even years
earlier—all of which dramatically limit its relevance to the charged
crime.
In fact, courts “routinely admit [other-acts] evidence whose relevance
depends primarily on propensity so long as it ultimately goes to prove
one of the listed ‘other purposes’ in 404(b).”27 It does not matter that the
other-acts evidence goes to the defendant’s character; as long as the
prosecutor is able to articulate one of the permissible purposes in addition
to character, the court will likely admit the evidence.28

23. State v. Murphy, 524 N.W.2d 924, 928 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing Wisconsin’s
landmark case Whitty v. State, 149 N.W.2d 557 (Wis. 1967)).
24. Edward Pare III, Restoring the Character Evidence Rule: Reconsidering Evidence of
Crimes, Wrongs, and Other Acts in Rhode Island, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 399, 399 (2016)
(citing Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American Criminal Trials, 47 GA. L.
REV. 775, 776–77 (2013)).
25. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1387. While other-acts evidence is, in theory,
admissible against the government’s witnesses as well, a double standard has emerged. See Jayna
M. Mathieu, Note, Reverse-Spreigl Evidence: Challenging Defendants’ Obligation to Exceed
Prosecutorial Standards to Admit Evidence of Third Party Guilt, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1033, 1034–
35 (2002) (“[C]ourts tend to reach different results in Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl cases. Contrary
to a Spreigl scenario, when defendants attempt to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence, trial courts
frequently exclude it.”).
26. People v. Crawford, 582 N.W.2d 785, 794 (Mich. 1998).
27. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1371.
28. See id. at 1385–86.
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But given the obvious prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence,
coupled with the mantra that “we try cases, rather than persons,”29 how
can courts justify the routine admission of other-acts evidence at trial?
III. CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS
In the face of the dual purpose for other-acts evidence—the
impermissible character inference on the one hand and a permissible,
statutory purpose on the other—courts typically deal with the character
aspect of the evidence by issuing a cautionary instruction. Once a
cautionary instruction “is properly given by the court, prejudice to a
defendant is presumed erased from the jury’s mind.”30
What is this cautionary instruction that has the power to instantly and
permanently eliminate all traces of improper influence on the jury? It is
often a short instruction, sometimes given at the time the other-acts
evidence is presented, cautioning the jury that the evidence is only
admissible for certain purposes such as proof of identity, intent, lack of
accident, and absence of self-defense.
Cautionary instructions—often called limiting instructions or curative
instructions—vary greatly across jurisdictions. The only thing the
instructions have in common is that each will name the purpose or
purposes for which the jury may use the evidence. Beyond that, some
instructions will caution the jury that “[y]ou must not convict the
defendant here because you think he is guilty of other bad conduct.”31
Other instructions are rather cumbersome—and probably
incomprehensible to many jurors—warning that “[y]ou must not consider
this act to determine the defendant’s character or character trait, or to
determine that the defendant acted in conformity with the defendant’s
character or character trait and therefore committed the charged
offense.”32
29. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988) (citing United States v. Mitchell,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 357 (1795)).
30. State v. Shillcutt, 341 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). State
court decisions throughout the country are littered with similar, but less extreme, assumptions
about cautionary instructions. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 719 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn. 2006)
(“[A]ny potential prejudice was mitigated by the limiting instruction given to the jury.”). Further,
“[u]nder the stewardship of Chief Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts, the [United States
Supreme] Court has shown no hesitation in asserting that juries can and will disregard
inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so.” Dan Simon, More Problems with Criminal
Trials: The Limited Effectiveness of Legal Mechanisms, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 179
(2012).
31. MICH. MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.11(3) (MICH. SUP. CT. COMM. ON MODEL
CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1993).
32. REVISED CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 26A (ST. B. OF ARIZ. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTION
COMM. 2016).
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Some instructions are incredibly brief and do little more than tell the
jury the obvious: “the defendant is not on trial for a crime, wrong, or act
that is not included in the indictment.”33 Finally, other instructions are
outright nonsensical and even self-contradictory. One federal court
instruction tells the jury that it may consider the other acts as proof of the
defendant’s intent or motive to commit the crime for which he is on trial;
however, it then instructs the jury that “[y]ou may not consider this
evidence as evidence of guilt of the crime for which the defendant is now
on trial.”34
Even assuming the trial judge reads a cautionary instruction that is
technically accurate, internally consistent, and comprehensible to the
average juror, it seems unlikely that such an instruction could erase the
prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence. Jurors are not computers. They
are probably not able to parse the evidence into its permissible and
impermissible purposes and then disregard the impermissible purposes as
if they were deleting unwanted files from a computer hard drive. That is,
curative “instructions are premised on a belief in people’s ability to exert
formidable control over their cognitive processing. This assumption runs
contrary to the research.”35
Given this gap between what the courts assume about cautionary
instructions—that all prejudice will be erased from the jury’s mind—and
how the human mind actually works,36 we decided to put the other-acts
33. FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIM. CASES § 2.4 (FLA. B. 2016).
34. MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NINTH CIR. (NINTH CIR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM.
2010) § 2.10 (emphasis added).
35. Simon, supra note 30, at 178 (discussing numerous studies of the effectiveness of
instructions to ignore evidence or to use evidence only for limited purposes).
36. Much of the research examines cautionary instructions for the impeachment of a
defendant with his prior convictions. See Eads et al., supra note 14, at 198 (discussing several
studies); Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect
of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1353, 1359 n.17 (2009) (collecting several studies); Simon, supra note 30, at 176–79
(discussing several studies and cases). From a psychological standpoint, impeachment with a prior
conviction is similar to the admission of other-acts evidence in terms of its impact on jurors’
perception of the defendant. However, there can also be significant differences. As discussed in
Part II of this Article, other-acts evidence under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) need not have resulted in a
criminal conviction—or even be criminal in nature—in order to be admissible. And other-acts
evidence typically involves detailed testimony by witnesses, whereas prior-conviction
impeachment evidence under FED. R. EVID. 609 may consist only of the fact and name of the
crime of conviction. Additionally, state-court rules on prior-conviction impeachment evidence
may restrict such information even further, allowing only the fact of a conviction without naming
the specific crime. See Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977,
1987–88 (2016). And of course, the cautionary instructions will also differ, given that
impeachment evidence is used for credibility, whereas other acts are used for such purposes as
identity, intent, lack of accident, and absence of self-defense, among others. FED. R. EVID. 404(b);
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
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cautionary instruction to an empirical test. Our study, discussed below,
was approved by Beloit College’s Institutional Review Board.
IV. THE STUDY
A. Hypothesis
We hypothesize that other-acts cautionary instructions are not
effective and that jurors who are presented with other-acts evidence will,
despite receiving a cautionary instruction, use the evidence for
impermissible purposes that increase the likelihood of conviction.
B. Participants
To test our hypothesis, we recruited 250 study participants through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online platform for conducting social
science research.37 Mechanical Turk has many advantages, including
“easy access to a large, stable, and diverse subject pool, the low cost of
doing experiments, and faster iteration between developing theory and
executing experiments.”38 Further, several studies have found a high
degree of similarity between the judgments and behaviors of Mechanical
Turk “workers” and of participants recruited in more conventional ways,
such as through university subject pools.39
These 250 participants served as mock jurors by reading a case
summary and rendering a verdict in a hypothetical criminal case. All
participants were required to be adults and U.S. citizens. To ensure data
quality, we monitored the participants and rejected those who completed
the task in fewer than three minutes; we immediately replaced them with
new participants in order to maintain our desired sample size. After the
data were collected, we discovered one participant had not indicated
whether he was a U.S. citizen; we discarded the participant’s data, leaving
us with a total of 249 mock jurors.
Our sample was large and diverse. Participants hailed from 42
different states. Fifty-two percent were female. Participants’ ages ranged
from 20 years to 73 years; the mean (average) age was 34.8 years, and
the median age (50th percentile) was 31 years. The ethnic composition of
the sample was also diverse: 72% non-Hispanic whites, 8% AfricanAmericans, 6% Hispanics, 9% Asian-Americans, 4% mixed race, and 1%
identifying as other. Sixty-two percent of the participants have at least a
four-year college degree, while an additional 29% have completed some
college. Fourteen percent reported having prior jury experience.
37. Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. 1 (2012).
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 3–4.
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C. Study Design
All mock jurors received a written case summary of a hypothetical
criminal trial. The case summary described two adults who met and
interacted at a party, which resulted in an accusation of a misdemeanor
fourth-degree sexual assault, i.e., the defendant’s sexual touching of the
alleged victim without her consent. All mock jurors received the
following information: an instruction on the charged crime, including its
elements; a 767-word summary of the testimony from the accuser and the
defendant, who were the two witnesses; and an instruction on the state’s
burden of proof.
More specifically, the accuser, Emily V., testified that she met the
defendant, John D., at a house party. At one point during the evening, she
went into a room with John and another couple—a man and a woman.
Emily had been drinking alcohol, “was slightly intoxicated,” and was
sitting on a couch with John while the couple sat near them in chairs. The
woman then left the room. John and the man were talking, and Emily fell
asleep. When she awoke, a man was standing over her and touching her
buttocks without her consent. She believed this man was John, the
defendant. After she told the man to “stop it,” there was a short struggle.
The man then left the room. Emily learned John’s full name from
someone at the party and promptly reported the incident to the police.
The defendant, John D., also testified. He admitted to drinking alcohol
at the party and also to consuming other drugs earlier in the day. John
acknowledged being in the room with Emily, the other man, and the other
woman. After Emily fell asleep and the other couple left the room, John
stood over Emily and checked on her to make sure she was okay. After
she responded to him, he left the room and then left the party. He denied
touching Emily’s buttocks “in any way or for any purpose” and also
denied struggling with her.
D. Identity Evidence
If a crime was committed, the identity of the perpetrator was not clear
from the case summary. The accuser was intoxicated and, at one point,
even fell asleep. She was also unfamiliar with the defendant; she had
never met or even seen him before the night of the party and did not know
his first name until she later learned it from another person. Further, there
were other people at the party including the other man who was in the
same room with the accuser and the defendant. Finally, the defendant
denied the allegation and testified that, after checking on the accuser, he
simply left the room and the party, and no assault had occurred up to that
point.
Given the possibility that, if a crime occurred, someone other than the
defendant committed it, identity was an issue in the case. With regard to
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identity evidence, mock jurors were randomly assigned to one of two
groups, Group A (N = 124) and Group B (N = 125). Mock jurors in Group
A received a stipulation on identity, which was provided immediately
after the accuser’s testimony. The stipulation read as follows:
The prosecutor and the defense attorney have stipulated
or agreed to the existence of certain facts, and you must
accept these facts as conclusively proved. In this case, the
prosecutor and defense attorney have stipulated to the
following facts:40
1. The defendant, John D. was the person on the couch
with Emily V.
2. The other man that was in the room left the room just
as Emily V. was falling asleep.
3. The defendant, John D. was the person standing over
Emily V.
4. At no time did the other man return to the room, and at
no time did any other man ever enter the room.
Group A’s stipulation was designed to remove all doubt about the
identity of the perpetrator. That is, if the jurors believed that a sexual
assault was committed, the crime could only have been committed by the
defendant. The breadth of the stipulation removes all speculation that the
crime could have been committed by the other man that was in the room
or by some other, unidentified man at the party. Group A also received
an additional instruction, immediately before the burden of proof
instruction, reminding mock jurors that the term “evidence” includes the
stipulation:
Evidence – Definition and Weight
“Evidence” includes the sworn testimony of witnesses
and any stipulations entered into between the parties. All
witnesses in this case were sworn before testifying. You are
the sole judges of the “credibility,” that is, the believability,

40. This instruction is closely modeled after WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 162 (UNIV.
WIS. LAW SCH. 2015). The enumerated facts on which the parties agreed are, of course, specific
to the facts of the case.
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of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their
testimony.41
The mock jurors in Group B, however, received different evidence to
prove identity. Group B was presented with the defendant’s other act: a
prior conviction for misdemeanor, fourth-degree sexual assault. This
information was provided immediately after the accuser’s testimony:
Testimony of Police Detective L. Hamilton
Hamilton is a police detective in a different county where
the defendant, John D., used to live. Hamilton testified that
he knew John, and was able to identify him in court.
Hamilton testified that, about three years ago in 2013, John
D. was charged and convicted of fourth degree sexual assault
for sexually touching a young woman, Heather B., without
her consent. John entered a plea of “no contest” and did not
go to trial. Hamilton read the following portion of John’s
written statement from 2013 about that incident with Heather
B. John had written: “I met Heather twice before, and I saw
her again last night and we went back to her apartment. We
had some drinks and I was giving her a backrub. Heather was
pretty drunk, and so was I, but she seemed to be enjoying the
backrub. I reached around and touched her chest over her
clothes. After a while I reached down the back of her pants
and was touching her butt. She seemed pretty into it and
didn’t say ‘stop’ so I kept doing it. I thought she was into it,
but she might have been too drunk to really know what was
happening. After a few minutes, though, she realized what
was happening and told me to ‘stop.’ I didn’t stop right
away, because I didn’t know if she really meant it. But I
stopped once I was sure she was really serious. She accused
me of touching her vagina, too, but I never did that. I only
touched her chest and her butt.”
Group B also received the same jury instruction on the definition of
“evidence.” However, Group B’s instruction did not include the reference
to the stipulation as Group B did not receive a stipulation. Instead, Group
B received a cautionary instruction on the other-acts evidence. We
selected the most pro-defendant cautionary instruction that we located
during our research. The instruction informs the jury that it is up to them
41. This instruction is an abbreviated instruction based on a combination of two Wisconsin
Criminal Jury Instructions. WIS. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 103, 300 (UNIV. WIS. LAW
SCH. 2015).
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to decide whether the other act occurred. It also instructs them that the
defendant’s other act can only be used for the purpose of identity, and not
for any other purpose. It also specifically warns them not to use the otheracts evidence to judge the defendant’s character or to convict the
defendant based on his character.42 The instruction, in its entirety, reads
as follows:
Cautionary Instruction
Evidence has been presented regarding other conduct of
the defendant for which the defendant is not on trial.
Specifically, evidence has been presented that the
defendant, in 2013, committed fourth degree sexual assault
against a different person, Heather B. If you find that this
conduct did occur, you should consider it only on the issue
of identity.
You may not consider this evidence to conclude that the
defendant has a certain character or a certain character trait
and that the defendant acted in conformity with that trait or
character with respect to the offense charged in this case
involving alleged victim Emily V.
The evidence was received on the issue of identity, that
is, whether the prior conduct of the defendant is so similar to
the offense charged that it tends to identify the defendant as
the one who committed the offense charged.
You may consider this evidence only for the purpose(s) I
have described, giving it the weight you determine it
deserves. It is not to be used to conclude that the defendant
is a bad person and for that reason is guilty of the offense
charged.43
42. Even under today’s rules of evidence that have chipped away at the character-evidence
prohibition, a prior misdemeanor—fourth-degree sexual assault conviction for touching a
person’s buttocks—would likely not be admissible to prove the defendant’s character. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 413 (permitting the use of the defendant’s prior sexual assault, when it involved
contact with the “genitals or anus,” to prove character); see also WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)(2)
(2017) (permitting the use of the defendant’s prior, first-degree sexual assault conviction to prove
character). Therefore, when character evidence is prohibited, as it is in the vast majority of
criminal cases, the prosecutor and trial judge would have to fit the defendant’s prior conviction
into one of the delineated, statutory purposes such as identity.
43. WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 275 (UNIV. WIS. LAW SCH. 2015).
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Between the two types of identity evidence, the stipulation provided
to Group A is far stronger, as it forecloses all speculation about the
identity of the perpetrator and provides conclusive proof that, if a crime
was committed, the defendant committed it. Such a stipulation is
probably the strongest of all types of evidence that could possibly be used
to prove identity.
Group B, on the other hand, received evidence of the defendant’s other
act, which is much weaker evidence of identity. That is, the cautionary
instruction framed the issue as “whether the prior conduct of the
defendant is so similar to the offense charged that it tends to identify the
defendant as the one who committed the offense charged.”44
While the defendant’s other act in the case summary was somewhat
similar—it involved touching without consent after drinking alcohol—
there were also numerous differences. For example, the other act involved
a person the defendant had met on two prior occasions, whereas the
charged crime involved a person the defendant had just met for the first
time. The other act occurred at the victim’s house where the defendant
was giving her a backrub, whereas the alleged crime occurred at a house
party with others present and where the accuser had fallen asleep.
Because Group A’s evidence on identity (the stipulation) was
conclusive, Group A should have the higher conviction rate of the two
groups. That is, because the other act provided to Group B had both
similarities and dissimilarities to the charged crime, it is far less reliable
evidence of identity. Therefore, if the cautionary instruction is truly
effective, and the jurors in Group B considered the other act “only on the
issue of identity,”45 then the conviction rate of Group A should be higher
than that of Group B.
We hypothesized, however, that the cautionary instruction will not be
effective, and that jurors will use the other acts for impermissible
purposes such as punishing the defendant for his past wrongs;
preemptively convicting him in order to prevent future bad acts; or
concluding that he possesses a bad character and is therefore guilty of the
charged crime. If our hypothesis is correct, then Group B’s conviction
rate should be higher, even though Group B received weaker evidence on
the issue of identity.
E. Findings
After receiving a burden of proof instruction, each mock juror
rendered a verdict of guilty or not guilty. In Group A, which received
conclusive proof of identity in the form of a stipulation, 41 of 124 mock
jurors returned verdicts of guilt for a group conviction rate of 33.1%. In
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id.
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Group B, which received evidence of the defendant’s somewhat similar
other act, 60 of 125 mock jurors returned verdicts of guilt for a group
conviction rate of 48.0%. The conviction rate among jurors who learned
of the other act (Group B) was nearly 50% higher than the conviction rate
among jurors who did not know about the defendant’s earlier conviction
but instead received the conclusive stipulation on identity (Group A).
The Z test for the difference between the two proportions—33.1% and
48.0%—produced a Z score of -2.4. This result is significant at the p <
.02 level, with an exact p-value of 0.016. The p-value measures the
probability of a Type I error, or the risk of obtaining a false positive when
testing a hypothesis, given the two sample sizes and the difference in
conviction rates between the two groups. In plain language, we are more
than 98% certain (1 – p) that the observed difference in conviction rates
between Groups A and B is a real difference that did not occur by chance.
Additionally, after participants rendered their verdict, they reported
how certain they were (on a 10-point scale) that they had made a correct
decision. Mock jurors in Group B—the group that received information
about the defendant’s other act—were more certain (mean score of 7.0)
in their verdict than were jurors in Group A (mean score of 6.4). This
difference is statistically significant at the p < .04 level. In plain language,
jurors who heard evidence of the defendant’s other act felt more certain
their verdict was correct, even though they were provided with less
persuasive evidence on the issue of identity.
We also uncovered several subsidiary findings not directly related to
the main purpose of our study: (a) women were no more likely than men
to vote guilty; (b) there were no statistically significant relationships
between a participant’s verdict and his or her age, ethnicity, or prior jury
experience; (c) across education categories, better-educated participants
were less likely to vote guilty, although the trend was not pronounced;
and (d) mock jurors who voted guilty, regardless of the group to which
they were randomly assigned, were considerably more certain that they
had made the correct decision (a mean score of 7.7 on a 10-point scale,
compared to a mean score of 6.1 among participants who voted not guilty,
p < .001).
Finally, participants also answered an attention-check question that
tested their recollection of the elements of the charged crime. The
question included five potential elements, only three of which were
correct. The attention-check results were encouraging, as 88% of all
participants correctly identified the elements of the charged crime.46
Those who voted not guilty were correct 91% of the time, while those
who voted guilty were correct 84% of the time. This difference is
46. Our standard for a correct answer was high; a mock juror who identified the correct
elements of the charged crime, but also an incorrect element, was classified as “incorrect.”
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marginally significant (Z = -1.7, p = .09); it suggests that those mock
jurors who paid closer attention to the legal elements of the charged crime
(fourth-degree sexual assault) were less likely to convict.
V. DISCUSSION: THE IMPACT OF OTHER ACTS
After conceding that jurors are likely to use other-acts evidence for
impermissible purposes, courts typically permit such evidence and
address its dangers by issuing a cautionary instruction.47 The courts
simply assume that this cautionary instruction will cure all unfair
prejudice to the defendant. Our findings, however, strongly support our
hypothesis that such cautionary instructions for other-acts evidence are
not effective, that jurors will consider a defendant’s other acts for
impermissible purposes such as character, and that such consideration
will lead jurors to convict at a higher rate.
More specifically, Group A in our study convicted at a rate of 33.1%,
which should have served as a ceiling on the conviction rate, as this group
received a stipulation that conclusively proved the defendant’s identity.
There is simply no better evidence to establish the defendant’s identity
than a clear, all-encompassing stipulation between the parties.
However, Group B, which received less-certain evidence on
identity—the defendant’s somewhat similar, three-year-old other act—
convicted at a rate of 48.0%. Had the cautionary instruction been
effective, i.e., had the jurors considered the other act only on the issue of
identity as they were instructed, Group B’s conviction rate should have
been no higher than Group A’s. Instead, it was much higher, and the
difference was highly significant (p < .02). Further, jurors in Group B,
after learning of the defendant’s prior conviction, were more confident in
their verdicts (p < .04).
This empirical evidence debunks the common judicial assumption that
a cautionary instruction on other-acts evidence will erase all prejudice
from the jurors’ minds. Our findings demonstrate that other-acts evidence
can lead jurors to convict a defendant not for what he has done, but for
who he is. Even the best, most comprehensive other-acts cautionary
instruction is about as effective as “throw[ing] a skunk into the jury box”
and “instruct[ing] the jury not to smell it.”48
Now that we have empirically confirmed our hypothesis and
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of cautionary instructions for other-acts
evidence, the next question is: What can defense lawyers do to protect a
47. See State v. Payano, 768 N.W.2d 832, 862 (Wis. 2009) (“[P]recedent suggests that
cautionary jury instructions can go a long way in limiting the unfair prejudice that may result from
the admission of other acts evidence.”).
48. Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
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defendant’s due process and other constitutional rights when the state
attempts to introduce other-acts evidence at trial?
VI. PRETRIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE DEFENSE
Litigating other-acts evidence requires an in-depth knowledge of the
particular state’s applicable rules and case law.49 However, the empirical
findings, case law, and secondary sources discussed in this Article point
to three, interrelated strategies for defense counsel’s consideration.
A. Relevance
Defense counsel should consider arguing that the defendant’s other
acts are not relevant and should therefore be excluded. Relevance can be
broken down into at least two parts.
One aspect of relevance is whether the permissible purpose—the
purpose for which the other-acts evidence is being offered—is in dispute.
For example, if the state is prosecuting a defendant for domestic violence
against his or her spouse, then identity will not be a contested issue at
trial. Therefore, the defendant’s prior battery conviction should not be
admissible for that purpose. Stated more broadly, “[i]f the state offers
other crimes evidence as relevant to specific elements of the crime
charged, and those elements are not at issue, the other crimes evidence is
inadmissible.”50
However, not all jurisdictions follow this rule. Instead, some simply
ignore this aspect of the relevancy analysis and permit the state to use
other-acts evidence even for issues that are not contested.51 To make
matters more complicated, the laws vary not only across states but
sometimes within states.52 For example, one court conceded that “[t]he
conflict between our decisions . . . poses a question of the precedent to be
followed.”53
49. See, e.g., Ruth Miller, Other Crimes Evidence: Relevance Reexamined, 16 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 371, 385–88 (1983) (discussing the various standards used in Illinois); Pare III, supra
note 24, at 399–402 (arguing for the “clear and convincing” standard instead of the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard in Rhode Island). Not only does the law in each state
and federal jurisdiction vary, but this Article is not intended to be comprehensive with regard to
litigating other-acts motions. There are several issues not even addressed in this Article, including
the notice requirement for the use of other-acts evidence and the burden of proof required to
demonstrate that the other acts actually occurred.
50. State v. Bedker, 440 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
51. See Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1400.
52. See id. at 1372 (“[T]he history of the rule in Minnesota and elsewhere is a history of
substantial confusion. . . . [T]he rule itself has been enforced inconsistently throughout its
history.”).
53. State v. Clark, 507 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); see also Sampsell-Jones,
supra note 17, at 1372 (“[T]he history of the rule in Minnesota and elsewhere is a history of
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The second aspect of relevancy is whether the other acts are relevant
to establish the stated, permissible purpose. For example, if the state
prosecutes a defendant for a masked robbery where the identity of the
perpetrator is truly in dispute, the question then becomes whether otheracts evidence (such as the defendant’s prior robbery conviction) is
relevant in establishing the defendant as the perpetrator. This analysis
typically hinges on the similarity between the other act and the charged
crime: the greater the similarity, the more likely the other act is to be
relevant and, therefore, admissible.54 One problem in determining
whether two things are similar, however, is the vagueness of the inquiry:
[I]n many cases, there is no way to determine which factors
cut which way. If a man [commits a crime] in Duluth and
another in Minneapolis, are the [crimes] geographically
similar because they both took place in the same state, or are
they geographically different because they took place 150
miles apart? Asking that question is roughly equivalent to
asking whether I am similar to a chimp.55
To apply this relevance analysis to the hypothetical sexual assault case
used in our study, there were several significant differences between the
other act and the charged crime. For example, in the other act, the
defendant had met the accuser on prior occasions; in the charged crime,
the defendant met the accuser only a short time before the alleged assault.
In the other act, the defendant and the accuser were alone at the accuser’s
home while the defendant gave her a backrub; in the charged crime, the
defendant and the accuser were at a house party with several other people
present. In the other act, the accuser was awake; in the charged crime, the
accuser had fallen asleep.
However, if a court were predisposed to admit the other-acts evidence,
it could find numerous similarities on which to hang its hat. For example,
both the other act and the charged crime involved alcohol consumption
by the defendant and the accuser. Further, each of the accusers was in an
impaired state—whether due to intoxication or sleep. Finally, both the
other act and the charged crime occurred in private homes, rather than in
public places.
This example leads to an even larger problem: in many cases, courts
do not undertake the similarity inquiry in good faith. Rather, they have
decided ahead of time to admit the other acts. Then, they search for
substantial confusion. . . . [T]he rule itself has been enforced inconsistently throughout its
history.”). The inconsistency of other-acts case law is not limited to Wisconsin or to this particular
aspect of the analysis.
54. See, e.g., Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1392 (discussing Minnesota’s competing
“marked” and “substantial” similarity tests for the admissibility of other-acts evidence).
55. Id. at 1392–93.
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commonalities—no matter how insignificant—to reach that
predetermined conclusion.
For example, where a defendant is charged with the serious crime of
“theft of a motor vehicle,” his prior bad acts of “receiving stolen
property” in the form of “a television set” and other “electrical
equipment” would strike most fair-minded readers as being very
dissimilar to the charged crime.56 Nonetheless, in a short opinion
unencumbered by legal analysis, an appellate court upheld a trial court’s
admission of the petty, other-acts evidence, holding that passively
receiving a stolen television set and electrical equipment were
substantially similar to stealing an automobile.57 Why? Because the
other-acts evidence and the charged crime were alleged to have occurred
in the same county, and “[e]ach was an offense against property.”58
By cherry-picking the most superficial similarity—in the above case,
the other act and the charged crime were both listed in the same chapter
of the criminal code—courts can justify admitting nearly any prior act
offered up by the prosecutor. In fact, a review of the case law in any state
will reveal that “[c]ourts have a long history of admitting evidence with
a fairly low degree of similarity.”59
Nonetheless, because there are often real and substantial differences
between the other acts and the charged crime, defense counsel can usually
make a strong argument that the other-acts evidence is dissimilar, and
therefore not relevant.60 Such an analysis is also a prerequisite to raising
additional challenges, described below.
B. Unfair Prejudice
Defense counsel should consider arguing that the other acts should be
excluded due to their unfair prejudice. Courts have defined unfair
prejudice as the risk “that the jurors would be so influenced by the other
acts evidence that they would be likely to convict the defendant because
the other acts evidence showed him to be a bad man.”61 However, as
56. State v. Schulberg, No. C4-95-2709, Minn. App. LEXIS 1120, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 24, 1996).
57. Id. at *3–4.
58. Id. at *4.
59. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1391, 1391–92 n.123 (citing numerous cases where
the courts found defendants’ other acts to be sufficiently similar to the charged crimes despite
their dramatic dissimilarity).
60. Each jurisdiction will have at least some published case law to support this argument.
See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d 30, 39 (Wis. 1998) (overturning conviction because “a
domestic disturbance between the defendant and his ex-wife in which they argued but there was
no physical contact” was not sufficiently similar to the charged crime which allegedly “involved
the defendant punching the complainant”).
61. Id. at 40.
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described earlier, this unfair prejudice might be “presumed erased from
the jury’s mind” once the court issues a cautionary instruction.62
Attempting to exclude other-acts evidence on grounds of unfair
prejudice requires at least two steps. First, because courts typically
require weighing the unfair prejudice against the probative value of the
evidence,63 counsel should first demonstrate (as discussed in the previous
Section)64 that the other acts are not relevant. If the other-acts evidence
has little or no relevance—either because the permissible purpose for
which it is offered is not in dispute, or because it does not tend to prove
the permissible purpose for which it is offered—then its unfair prejudice
will necessarily outweigh its probative value. The evidence, therefore,
should be excluded.65
Second, because courts can easily avoid weighing unfair prejudice
against the probative value by simply issuing a cautionary instruction,
counsel should debunk the misconception that cautionary instructions
cure unfair prejudice. This, in turn, can be accomplished from both a legal
and empirical perspective. From a legal perspective, most states have at
least some published cases holding that cautionary instructions were not
adequate to address the risk of unfair prejudice, and defense counsel
should locate and cite any factually similar cases.66
From an empirical perspective, the findings in this study and Article—
along with the findings in related studies testing the effectiveness of
cautionary instructions in similar contexts67—demonstrate that such
instructions are simply not effective. Here, an application of the Fifth

62. State v. Shillcutt, 341 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
63. See Vivian M. Rodriguez, The Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under
the Intent Provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Weighing of Incremental Probity
and Unfair Prejudice, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451, 454 (1993).
64. See supra Section VI.A.
65. Even when the other-acts evidence is very similar to the charged crime, and therefore
deemed to be relevant, counsel will still have an argument to exclude the evidence. The reason is
that as the level of similarity increases, so does the unfair prejudice. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Hans,
supra note 36, at 1359 (discussing an increase in conviction rates when mock jurors “learned of a
defendant’s previous record for crimes similar to that charged”).
66. The most useful cases for this purpose are those where courts ultimately deemed the
cautionary instruction inadequate because the other-acts evidence was highly inflammatory. In
other cases, however, cautionary instructions can be deemed inadequate simply because the judge
failed to competently draft the instruction. E.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 176 n.2
(1997) (criticizing the trial court’s instruction to the jury to use the defendant’s prior conviction
to decide his “believability as a witness” when, in fact, the defendant never testified); Sullivan,
576 N.W.2d at 40 (“[I]n this case the cautionary instruction to the jury about the other acts
evidence was too broad, and its cautionary effect was significantly diminished.”).
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Circuit’s skunk analogy68 is useful. Our findings demonstrate that even a
well-drafted cautionary instruction is about as effective as throwing a
skunk into the jury box and then instructing the jury to consider the smell
only on the issue of whether the skunk expelled sulfur-laden chemicals,
but not to conclude that the skunk is a smelly animal. To assume the jury
would—or even could—follow such an instruction is “unmitigated
fiction.”69
C. The Stipulation
A third potential defense strategy is to stipulate to the element of the
crime for which the other-acts evidence is being offered. In our study’s
hypothetical sexual assault case, the defendant stipulated to the facts
necessary to establish his identity. If a crime was in fact committed, the
defendant conceded that he would have been the one who committed it.
Such an approach would provide the state with conclusive proof on an
element of the crime,70 thus rendering the other acts inadmissible. In
some respects, this strategy circles back to the first two issues: the
stipulation renders the other-acts evidence completely irrelevant; and,
without any relevance, the probative value of the other acts would
necessarily be substantially outweighed by their unfair prejudice.71
However, just as with the relevancy analysis, not all courts permit the
defendant to use this strategy. Instead, some allow the prosecutor to reject
the stipulation in order to “prove his case his own way.”72 Stated more
cynically, some states allow the prosecutor to harness the unfair prejudice
of the other-acts evidence to win a conviction. And, to make matters more
complicated, the law not only varies across states but, once again, can
also vary within states.73
68. Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962) (analogizing the cautionary
instruction to telling the jurors to ignore the smell of a skunk just thrown into the jury box).
69. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(discussing the ineffectiveness of cautionary instructions).
70. For this reason, stipulations should not be offered casually, and only after consulting
with the defendant and complying with all of the state’s procedural safeguards.
71. See Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 456 (“The scaling of probative value and potential
unfair prejudice . . . should take into consideration the defendant’s offer to remove the
issue . . . from the case.”).
72. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 177 (1997). Conversely, the Second Circuit
has held that the defendant’s stipulation may prevent the government’s use of such evidence. See
United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81, 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1979). This, however, is the minority
view. See, e.g., United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 805 (7th Cir. 1985) (“This court has
previously rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Manafzadeh because, in effect, it allows a
defendant to remove intent as an element of the crime charged.”).
73. Here, once again, Wisconsin serves as an example of the legal chaos, as two lines of
authority emerged: one where the defendant has the right to stipulate to an element of the crime
and avoid the state’s other-acts evidence and another where he does not. See State v. Veach, 648

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2

370

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

In any case, the analysis for stipulations begins with Old Chief v.
United States.74 Pursuant to Old Chief, the defendant has the right, in
some circumstances, to force the trial judge and the prosecutor to accept
a stipulation.75 Further, defense counsel could even be found ineffective
for failing to offer one.76 But this per se rule may be limited to situations
where the evidence is being offered to prove a defendant’s legal status—
for example, his preexisting status as a convicted felon when charged
with being a felon in possession of a firearm77—which is typically
distinct from the classic uses of other-acts evidence.78
When the prosecutor offers other acts for purposes other than proving
the defendant’s legal status, the trial judge or the prosecutor might be free
to reject a defendant’s stipulation. For example, in State v. Veach,79 the
court cited Old Chief and held that the trial judge properly rejected the
stipulation because, rather than being used to prove the defendant’s legal
status, the other-acts evidence was being offered to demonstrate his
“intent or motive” or absence of “mistake.”80 The court seemed to justify
this ruling on two different grounds, neither of which is persuasive.
First, the Veach court stated that a defendant “may not stipulate or
admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the
Government chooses to present it.”81 But if this reasoning was valid,
courts would never bother issuing a curative instruction, the purpose of
which is to limit the full evidentiary force of other-acts evidence. In other
words, the risk that accompanies other acts is that they could be used as
character evidence. But the problem is not that “character is irrelevant;
on the contrary,” a defendant’s character is relevant.82 The reason such
evidence is excluded is the fundamental principle that “we try cases,

N.W.2d 447, 474 (Wis. 2002) (Crooks, J., concurring) (“The majority implies that it is overruling
Wallerman and DeKeyser . . . but does not do so explicitly. In fact . . . the majority suggests that
it is only modifying those cases by stating, ‘We do not mean to imply that Wallerman stipulations
are per se invalid . . . .’”).
74. 519 U.S. at 174 (1997).
75. See id. (holding that, in limited circumstances, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial
court to reject a defendant’s stipulation).
76. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, No. 2014AP2302-CR, 2015 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2015)
(per curiam) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to stipulate that the defendant
had been charged with a felony at the time he allegedly committed the act that formed the basis
for his bail jumping charge).
77. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174.
78. See Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 452.
79. 648 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Wis. 2002).
80. Id. at 453.
81. Id. at 472 (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186–87).
82. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
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rather than persons.”83 And because a jury should only convict a
defendant “for what he did, not for who he is,”84 the defendant therefore
should have the right to evade the full evidentiary force of the other-acts
evidence.85
And this point leads us back to our empirical findings: cautionary
instructions for other-acts evidence are not effective. Jurors will consider
a defendant’s other acts for impermissible purposes such as character, and
such consideration does lead jurors to convict at a much higher rate. Yet,
this problem would be solved if the trial judge and the prosecutor were
required to accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate to the element for which
the other acts are ostensibly being used.
Second, the Veach court also stated that, unlike the stipulation in Old
Chief, “the stipulation proposed by the defendant is simply inadequate to
inform the jury of what is agreed to and what is in dispute, and to remove
the issues from the case.”86 This can be a legitimate point. A defendant’s
stipulation should be broad enough to completely resolve the issue. For
example, the stipulation used in our study removed all doubt about
identity, and the jury could only conclude that, if a crime was in fact
committed, the defendant committed it.
But drafting a stipulation broadly enough to satisfy a court may
require even more creativity. In Veach, the defendant was charged with
sexually touching a child and offered to stipulate that, if the touching
occurred, it “was intentional and for the purpose of sexual
gratification.”87 But the court concluded that such a stipulation was
defective, as it “would not properly inform the jury that accident or
mistake, two issues which the facts of this case obviously touched upon,
were subject to the stipulation.”88
The court’s decision can only be described as disingenuous. If a
defendant stipulates that an act “was intentional and for the purpose of
sexual gratification,” the act is, by definition, not an “accident or
mistake.” As the three dissenting judges stated, instead of being “honest
83. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988) (citing United States v. Mitchell,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 357 (1795)).
84. United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977).
85. Some “other acts” do lave legitimate evidentiary force that should not be diluted by a
stipulation. However, such evidence does not fall into the category of other-acts evidence. Rather,
because such acts are “so inextricably intertwined with, or intricately related to, the charged
conduct that they help the fact-finder form a more complete picture of the crime,” they are
considered an entirely separate class of evidence and are governed by different rules of
admissibility. United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Schuster,
supra note 8, at 961–70 (discussing the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine).
86. Veach, 648 N.W.2d at 473.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
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and forthright . . . the majority engages in legal gymnastics to justify the
admission of propensity evidence in contravention of the statute.”89
The dissenters’ harsh words ring true and provide the only plausible
explanation for the majority’s pseudo-reasoning. They also provide a
cautionary tale for defense counsel: If the defense decides to offer a
stipulation on an element of the crime, the stipulation should be both
broad and redundant.90
VII. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE STUDY
Our findings provide strong evidence that other-acts cautionary
instructions are not effective, that jurors will use a defendant’s other acts
for impermissible purposes, and that jurors exposed to other-acts
evidence will convict at a much higher rate. Our findings also make a
strong case for the expansion of Old Chief’s holding. That is, our justice
system should permit a criminal defendant to stipulate not only to his
legal status but also to other elements of the charged crime in order to
avoid the unfairly prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence.
However, critics may argue that our study has several limitations: our
use of the case summary method, our use of a single criminal charge and
fact pattern, the lack of deliberation by our mock jurors, our inability to
observe the participants’ level of attention, and our failure to screen the
participants for bias. We discuss these potential criticisms below.
A. Case Study Method
Our study employed a written case summary method, in which the
jury was provided with the elements of the charged crime, a summary of
the witnesses’ testimony, and jury instructions. This is similar to the
method that has been used in many peer-reviewed studies, including
studies that examined the impact of a defendant’s personal characteristics
on jury decision making.91 However, some social scientists have
89. Id. at 475 (Abrahamson, C.J., Bablitch & Bradley, JJ., dissenting).
90. One creative way of attempting to ensure that a stipulation is adequately broad is to
remove the element of the crime from the jury instruction itself. To draw an analogy, when trial
judges fail to instruct jurors on all of the elements of the charged crime, courts have held that such
omissions can be harmless error. See, e.g., People v. Flood, 957 P.2d 869, 872 (Cal. 1998) (stating
that “removing [an] element of the crime from the jury’s consideration” does not invalidate the
conviction). Therefore, eliminating elements of the crime from the jury instruction for purposes
of a stipulation, when done on the defendant’s motion, should be legally permissible. Ensuring
the stipulation is adequately redundant, however, may require an even greater level of
imagination.
91. Wayne Weiten & Shari S. Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation
Paradigm, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71, 77 (1979); see also Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision
Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 113, 129–30 (1987).
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expressed concerns about the ecological validity of these studies and have
called for more realistic trial simulations.92
Conversely, other social scientists have noted the prohibitive costs of
more realistic trial simulations93 or have failed to observe differences in
the reactions of mock jurors to abbreviated or more elaborate case
summaries.94 Therefore, “[e]ven highly artificial simulations are not
inherently distorting and may actually inform us on relationships of real
significance for law and human behavior.”95 Further, the more realistic
trial simulation methods actually “provide a myriad of additional legally
relevant and irrelevant bases on which to make a decision,” including,
for example, a defendant’s or witness’s race and ethnicity.96
Seen in this light, the simplicity of the case summary method may
actually be its strength. First, researchers who use the case summary
method can eliminate extrajudicial factors, including race and ethnicity,
that may have an impact on jurors’ decision-making processes.97 Second,
the more abbreviated case summary method compresses events in time,
thereby reducing the pernicious effect of forgetting, which can also affect
jurors’ decision-making processes.98 And third, the case summary
method allows researchers to test the impact of a specific component of
a trial that may get lost in the clutter of a more complex trial simulation.99
For these reasons, “more abbreviated experimental stimulus materials,”
such as the case summary method, “can play an important role in
addressing some questions about jury behavior.”100

92. Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury
Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & LAW 589, 592 (1997) (“A better methodology is to
provide a videotaped trial to participants. The videotaped format provides a highly engaging
simulation, and is much more representative of an actual trial. Consequently, greater faith can be
placed in studies using this methodology than experiments using transcripts or case summaries.”).
93. Shari S. Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 561, 566 (1997).
94. Geoffrey P. Kramer & Norbert L. Kerr, Laboratory Simulation and Bias in the Study of
Juror Behavior: A Methodological Note, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 89 (1989) (“Results
provided no support for the contention that treatment effects act differently as a function of the
length of the stimulus trial in which they are embedded. Rather, it is suggested that treatments
used in simplified jury simulations may often show similar effects when examined in more
realistic, complex settings if the treatments are comparable.”).
95. Id.
96. Diamond, supra note 93, at 564 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 563–64.
99. Id. at 564.
100. Id. (arguing that while certain studies, such as those that test “the credibility of various
types of expert testimony” demand “a fairly elaborate simulation,” other studies can be
accomplished using “a less extensive trial stimulus”).
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B. Single Fact Pattern
All empirical studies are flawed in the sense that methodological
decisions designed to solve one problem often exacerbate another. For
example, controlled experiments that use random assignment, such as
ours, solve the problem of causal ambiguity, i.e., determining what
produced the effect. However, the desire to control extraneous variables
may constrain the researcher’s ability to generalize the study’s results
beyond the specific conditions tested.
We used a single fact pattern that we held constant across test
conditions. Consequently, we cannot assume an identical outcome for
different fact patterns. We therefore encourage future researchers to
replicate our study but to use different test materials when doing so,
including, for example, a different charged crime, fact pattern, other-acts
evidence, and permissible purpose for the other-acts evidence.
C. Lack of Deliberations
Our study tested the impact of the cautionary instruction on individual
mock jurors’ verdicts. These mock jurors did not deliberate as a group
before reaching their decisions. In this sense, our study differed from an
actual jury trial and some other jury simulation studies.
Some studies show that “deliberations sometimes do influence
outcomes” including, for example, a study in which juror deliberations
reduced individual juror biases and made them more likely to follow the
judge’s instructions.101 However, the evidence on the impact of
deliberations is, at best, mixed.102
For example, several studies have tested the impact of deliberations
on the physical attractiveness bias, i.e., the tendency for jurors to perceive
and treat attractive defendants more favorably than plain-looking
defendants.103 One study found that deliberation mitigated the physical
attractiveness bias.104 A later study, however, found that deliberation
exacerbated the bias.105 Most surprising of all, a third study found a

101. Id. at 565.
102. Id.; see also Lieberman & Sales, supra note 92, at 635 (“On the basis of these
contradictory findings, we cannot assume that deliberation will eliminate the problem of
incomprehensible instructions.”).
103. Marc W. Patry, Attractive but Guilty: Deliberation and the Physical Attractiveness
Bias, 102 PSYCHOL. REP. 727, 727 (2008).
104. Richard R. Izzett & W. Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of Defendant
Characteristics in a Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271, 271 (1974).
105. Robert J. MacCoun, The Emergence of Extralegal Bias, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 303,
303 (1990).
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reversal of the expected effect: Mock jurors who deliberated were biased
against the attractive defendant.106
Numerous published studies involving mock jurors do not include
deliberations.107 Further, in the end, requiring mock jurors to deliberate
before rendering a verdict is unlikely to change the observed pattern of
verdicts across conditions. Rather, “[t]he prevailing view . . . is that
deliberations play a minor role in determining jury verdicts because the
predeliberation majority generally prevails in the end.”108
D. Participant Attention Level
When using Mechanical Turk, as opposed to collecting data in a
laboratory setting, it is not possible to directly observe the study
participants’ level of attention. However, before results were known, we
were able to reject participants who spent fewer than three minutes on the
task. We also tested our mock jurors’ attention level through the use of a
post-verdict attention-check question. As indicated above, these results
were encouraging. Mock jurors answered the question correctly 88% of
the time, thus demonstrating that they devoted adequate attention to the
case study materials before rendering their verdicts.
Furthermore, the issue of inattentive jurors is a problem that exists
with real-life jurors as well. Far worse than merely being inattentive,
sleeping jurors are often tolerated as long as the trial judge concludes that
the jurors were not sleeping too long, or that the evidence they missed
was not important enough, to justify a new trial.109
E. Participant Bias
In theory, biased jurors are excused from jury duty and do not
participate in actual trials. In our Mechanical Turk study, we were not
able to screen participants in advance for potential bias. However, four
things mitigate this potential problem. First, many biases—for example,
racial bias—would not have been factors in our case. Our hypothetical
defendants’ (and even the witnesses’) race was not provided.

106. Patry, supra note 103, at 731.
107. See, e.g., Bette L. Bottoms et al., Gender Differences in Jurors’ Perceptions of
Infanticide Involving Disabled and Non-Disabled Infant Victims, 35 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
127, 131 (2011); Joanna D. Pozzulo et al., The Effects of Victim Gender, Defendant Gender, and
Defendant Age on Juror Decision Making, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 47, 54 (2010); Cynthia J.
Najdowski et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Juvenile Defendants: The Influence of Intellectual
Disability, Abuse History, and Confession Evidence, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 401, 406, 415 (2009).
108. Diamond, supra note 93, at 564.
109. See State v. Chestnut, 643 S.W.2d 343, 346, 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding the
denial of defendant’s motion for new trial despite undisputed evidence of three jurors sleeping
through evidentiary portions of trial).
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Second, in actual courtrooms across the country, biased jurors find
their way onto juries. In fact, to exclude a subjectively biased juror, all of
the following must happen: the would-be juror must be aware of his or
her bias; the judge or the attorneys must devise questions to expose that
particular bias; and the would-be juror must actually admit his or her bias
to a roomful of fellow citizens. For all of these things to happen is a rare
occurrence indeed.
Third, even when a juror is, by all accounts, objectively biased, he or
she may still be permitted to serve on the jury. Perhaps the most egregious
example occurred when a court permitted the prosecutor’s own employee
to serve on the defendant’s jury, finding that the employee–employer
relationship between the juror and the prosecutor was not sufficient to
justify the juror’s removal.110
Finally, there is a fourth mitigating factor: the random assignment of
the study participants to test conditions. The virtue of random assignment
is that, when used with large numbers of study participants, it produces
groups that are statistically equivalent to each other in all respects. Each
group has roughly the same number of mock jurors, the same number of
men and women, the same number of well-educated and poorly educated
persons, and the same number of biased and unbiased individuals.
When test groups are statistically equivalent at the outset; receive
different evidence on identity; and then convict at different rates, we can
be quite certain that the different conviction rates were produced by the
different evidence and not by personal characteristics of the mock jurors
in a particular group. In plain language, random assignment creates a
level playing field where the effects of bias are distributed equally across
the test conditions. Therefore, we can attribute the result—a difference in
conviction rates—only to the variable that was manipulated.
CONCLUSION
While evidence of a defendant’s bad character is generally not
admissible at trial, courts will still permit the prosecutor to introduce
evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts. In some jurisdictions, the
110. See State v. Smith, 716 N.W.2d 482, 493 (Wis. 2006). The dissent, however, offered a
far more rational view:
An objectively reasonable person in the place of the challenged prospective juror
would not ordinarily be able to separate his or her economic and loyalty interests
from the determinations he or she would be required to make as juror. An
employee of a district attorney’s office should therefore be struck as a juror for
cause when that office is prosecuting a case.
Id. at 495 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). Therefore, this problem—the potential for participant
bias—again mirrors the problems encountered with real-life jurors.
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prosecutor’s only substantive hurdle is that the other-acts evidence must
also be relevant for some permissible purpose—such as the defendant’s
identity, intent, or absence of accident—in addition to demonstrating bad
character.111
In order to protect the defendant against the impermissible character
inference, courts will issue a cautionary instruction telling the jury to
consider the other acts only for their legally proper purpose. Courts then
blindly assume that such cautionary instructions will erase all prejudice
from the jurors’ minds.112
Given that this judicial assumption does not square with the
psychological research on the way the human mind functions, we
empirically tested this claim. We recruited 249 mock jurors, all of whom
read the same case summary of a hypothetical criminal trial. Mock jurors
were then randomly assigned to one of two groups, each of which
received different evidence on the issue of identity.113
Mock jurors in Group A received conclusive evidence on identity in
the form of a stipulation. One-third of these mock jurors convicted the
defendant. Mock jurors in Group B received less certain evidence on
identity in the form of the defendant’s somewhat similar other act. Group
B also received a cautionary instruction. Nearly half of these mock jurors
convicted the defendant, even though they were instructed that the
evidence could be used only for the purpose of identity and not to
determine the defendant’s character. This nearly 50% increase in
conviction rates was highly significant (p < .02). Jurors in Group B (who
received the other-acts evidence) were also more certain in their verdicts
(p < .04).114
Our findings are strong empirical evidence that other-acts evidence
increases the likelihood of conviction and that cautionary instructions for
other acts are not effective. Given this, defense counsel should consider
offering a stipulation to the element of the crime for which the other-acts
evidence is ostensibly being offered. Further, defense counsel should
consider using the empirical findings discussed in this Article—with or
without the use of a stipulation—to demonstrate that the unfair prejudice
associated with other-acts evidence substantially outweighs any
probative value and, therefore, the other acts should be excluded from the
defendant’s trial.115

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Sections IV.A–IV.D.
See supra Section IV.E.
See supra Part VI.
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